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he mining industry is usually 
characterized as a curse, also known 
as the "paradox of plenty". Today, 
New Caledonia bears the brunt of the 
falling price of nickel, the end of the 
construction of two new nickel plants and 
the economic downturn. However, New 
Caledonia, which is supposed to have 25% 
of the world’s deposits of nickel, attempted 
to overcome this curse. The mining 
industry was supposed to secure economic 
self-sufficiency and pay for a viable 
independence. This is a common belief in 
nationalism for natural resources. The 
country and its provinces tried to build a 
mining strategy based on added value and, 
for some, government majority equity in 
local companies. 
New Caledonia has been changing a lot 
since the Noumea Agreement in 1998. 
Three new nickel plants were launched, 
which join the sole one New Caledonia 
already had, the Doniambo plant owned by 
Société Le Nickel. As political power is 
shared in New Caledonia, therefore plant 
equity should now be shared. 
 The country through the three 
provinces owns 34% of Société Le 
Nickel equity. It’s a legacy of 
history.  
 However, the country through the 
three provinces holds only 5% 
equity of the southern plant owned 
and operated by Vale. It was a 
choice, thanks to liberal political 
concepts.  
 A local mining company controlled 
by the Northern province of New 
Caledonia (SMSP) owns, on paper, 
51% of the northern plant equity 
(Koniambo Nickel - KNS). This 
choice is in accordance with a 
socialist mixed economy, claimed 
by independence movements.  
 Posco processing plant, built off 
shore in Korea, enhance lower 
content nickel ore deposits. SMSP, 
the local mining company 
controlled by the Northern 
province, owns, on paper, 51% of 
SNNC equity (Société du Nickel de 
Nouvelle-Calédonie et Corée Pty 
Ltd), which is the owner of the 
Gwangyang plant. 
The mining stock market crash had shaken 
people's beliefs. When nickel made money, 
New Caledonia built castles in the air. 
When the prices are low, people only see 
losses. Financial arrangement for the plants 
turned out to be less attractive as people 
thought before. The truth is somewhere in 
the middle. Were Caledonians robbed from 
their mining wealth? 
For these new plants, New Caledonia 
granted the multinational companies huge 
financial backing: the national and local 
government gave massive tax exemptions 
for people investing in French overseas 
territories; there is no local tax for 15 years 
after the commercial production begins. 
Moreover, access to the nickel ore deposits 
was free, without paying any duty. So far, 
there is no tax on the extracted metric ton 
of soil. From North to South of New 
Caledonia, multinational companies fund 
the construction of all the plants and 
therefore fully operate the nickel industry. 
They secure the ore supplies and raw 
material purchase contracts, hold the 
exclusive rights in the industrial process 
and patent. They control the distribution 
network, impose their decisions by 
blackmailing jobs and will take huge 
interests on the debt of local affiliate 
companies. An increasing debt allowed the 
new plants. Moreover, it’s the resource, 
which has been used as security for a very 
long term. Every new investment will 
extend the repayment period as well as the 
length of availability of the nickel deposit 
by multinational companies.  
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These three financial packages 
demonstrate that capital structure differs 
from financing of industrial projects. These 
are two different things: 51% doesn’t give 
necessarily access to decision-making 
power. Even though Glencore and Posco in 
the North are minority equity shareholders, 
like Vale or Eramet in the South, they are 
the real leaders of the partnerships. What 
really matters is the effective decision-
making power, which comes out of the 
own self-financing ability. The world of 
commodities is primarily governed by 
finance. Anyway, the country and its 
provinces jointly bear today some of the 
financial or industrial risk of a downturn, 
while their financial partners that are the 
multinational companies will cash in most 
of the financial profits. This means that 
future generations will have to pay the full 
price for environmental damage and debt.  
 
Could it go differently? Politicians in the 
country are deeply divided on the issue of 
resource nationalism. Pending the ultimate 
takeover of SLN’s mining resource by the 
rise in equity to up to 50.1% or banning 
export of raw nickel ore to supply Korea, 
supporters of “the Orthodoxy of 51% 
equity share” imagine to achieve a 
hypothetical “economic sovereignty” from 
the crust of resource nationalism. They try 
instead to provide SMSP with new mining 
titles in order to revive a third project with 
Jinchuan in China. As with the Korean 
partnership, this would provide the joint 
venture new mining resources for cash 
under the guise of a mythical participation 
majority. 
 
Policy thinking: New Caledonia hasn’t 
emerged today from the natural resource 
curse. The country focuses all of its 
energies on a single industry, such as 
mining, and neglects other major sectors. 
As a result, the nation is overly dependent 
on the price of commodities and its 
economy is becoming extremely volatile. 
Prosperous years allowed avoiding to 
choose. As in the other French territories, 
economic issues such as: competitiveness, 
productivity, investment’s viability were 
put on the backbench. Theoretical 
questions are predominant: the sharing of 
power between the country and the 
provinces, the balance of power between 
Congress and government, the so-called 
“Orthodoxy of 51% equity share”. 
Theoretical questions lead quickly to 
mental block. Nothing is solved and many 
people would take to the streets. Maybe 
it’s time of proclaiming a moratorium, so 
the New Caledonian population could 
finally digest and appropriate as much as 
possible a relative control of existing 
industrial projects and begin to improve 
competitiveness. This is far less noble, but 
certainly more effective.  
 
Summary: Introduction 
1. Nickel plants became real 
a. Political power is shared in New 
Caledonia:  
b. (Therefore) Plant equity is shared 
2. Nickel plants haven’t provided the 
required economic power to New 
Caledonia 
a. The dispossession of the mining 
resource by multinational companies 
b. A strategy of resource nationalism for 
the country?  
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